The scene in Tianjin, eastern China, during the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) summit had a clear target: Donald Trump. After backtracking on his tariff threat against China, the U.S. president had to notice Beijing’s tactical victory in its area of interest: the Asia-Pacific. The image of closeness between Xi Jinping, Vladimir Putin, and Narendra Modi, the three major powers not aligned with the West, was meant to dissuade the world — especially those present at the summit — from believing that the United States would remain the hegemonic power in Asia.
For all their posturing, the three leaders’ closeness has a political goal. The border dispute between China and India has barely cooled down, just like the military clash between India and Pakistan, a close friend of Beijing. The point is that Trump will find it difficult to separate allies and semi-allies who increasingly see Washington as an adversary that must be stopped. Smiles and laughter do not fully obscure internal tensions, but the summit was nonetheless unsettling for the United States, which until recently still counted on India within anti-China institutions such as the Quad.
Naturally, this is all to the Chinese regime’s liking. The cordiality between Xi and Putin, following Trump’s diplomatic defeat at the Alaska summit, was yet another symbol of the close propaganda link between Beijing and Moscow, self-proclaimed bearers of a capitalist world order that challenges the one dominated by the United States since the end of the Cold War. For his part, Narendra Modi tried to show that India has other important friends — including China, despite the unresolved border dispute — if the Trump administration decides to continue attacking New Delhi with tariffs.
Despite having been established in 2001 when China was accepted into the World Trade Organization under the auspices of the Bill Clinton administration, the SCO’s recent meeting 24 years later seems to have been its official inauguration. It has been the largest summit held to date by this China-dominated body, bringing together heads of state from 20 countries, including Russia, India, Iran, and Turkey, a NATO member and the main beneficiary of the fall of Bashar al-Assad’s dictatorial regime in Syria. Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan participated in person. Officials representing Pakistan, Kyrgyzstan, Kazakhstan, and Belarus were also in attendance.
The stage was set for Xi Jinping as the representative of free trade. In addition to India, China appeared alongside countries like Pakistan, Myanmar, and Sri Lanka, all victims of the trade war waged by the White House. In his opening speech, Xi seized the moment to be the “spokesperson” for the economic discontent of the states currently negotiating their tariffs with Trump, urging members of the group to oppose “Cold War mentality, bloc confrontation, and bullying.” This message resonated with Modi, who spoke at the summit about “promoting multilateralism and an inclusive world order”; that is, a system in which countries like India would have a greater say in global affairs.
Putin once again praised strategic relations with China and lauded the recent summit in Alaska with Trump, where Russia and the United States discussed proposals for the catastrophic war in Ukraine, initiated by Moscow’s reactionary occupation and exploited by the U.S. government in the name of NATO’s militarization of Europe. Putin and Xi celebrated the military parade commemorating the 80th anniversary of the end of World War II together, accompanied by Kim Jong-un of North Korea and Iranian President Masoud Pezeshkian.
China thus carefully designed the meeting to present itself as the power most capable of bringing together Washington’s dissidents. Thanks to its growing power on the international stage, its growing presence in the economic life of the most economically precarious countries, and its ability to compete in niches of labor exploitation and capital accumulation in those nations, China can use these good relations to its advantage in the Sino-U.S. dispute.
First, Xi highlighted the failure of Trump’s attempt to drive a wedge between Russia and China:
China is willing to strengthen high-level exchanges with Russia, support each other in development and revitalization, coordinate positions on issues affecting the core interests and major concerns of both countries at the right time, and promote bilateral relations for further development.
He also signaled to Trump thatthe countries that are part of his strategic defense circuit in Asia, such as India, are not fully committed to the White House’s anti-China goals. Modi, criticized by Trump for becoming a major importer of Russian oil (which is why 50% tariffs are being applied to Indian goods), praised Putin and said that the people of India are eagerly awaiting his state visit to New Delhi in December.
Similarly, Xi took advantage of the stage to attract Turkey, one of the most ambitious players in the current international situation, projecting its influence across the Balkans, the Caucasus, the Middle East, Central Asia, and North Africa. Turkey has its own expansionist project in its sphere of influence in the Middle East, which has intensified following the fall of al-Assad in Syria, a country whose ruins and portions of territory it aggressively disputes with the colonialist terrorist state of Israel.
It is important to note that not a word was said at the summit about the genocide of the Palestinians, despite these countries claiming to be an “alternative” to the imperialist order that promotes barbarities like those we see in Gaza.
In a context of U.S. hegemonic decline — and virtual “absence of hegemony,” from a certain point of view — these partial achievements are not insignificant for China’s capitalist government. The relative weakness of the United States is apparent on important geopolitical stages like Asia, giving initiatives such as the SCO more strength than they would have on their own. With personal meetings with each of the 19 heads of state present, Xi is displaying a diplomatic hyperactivity that is simply unmatched from the United States. In a fragmented world subject to the shocks of economic protectionism, such behavior is part of the calculations of nation states most vulnerable to conflicts between powers.
This is the content of what Xi called the Global Governance Initiative, a proposal for unity among Asian countries for a new model of management and administration of relations between countries, outside of U.S. unipolarity. Its five principles (to the liking of a government that likes to appear as the protagonist of multilateral initiatives) would be: adhering to sovereign equality, respecting the international rule of law, practicing multilateralism, defending a people-centered approach, and focusing on concrete actions. The vagueness of the definitions is useful for attracting a multitude of countries with few common interests and many rivalries.
Within the project, Xi urged the organization to promote open cooperation around the world:
We must continue to break down barriers, not erect them; we must seek integration, not separation. We must promote high-quality cooperation under the Belt and Road Initiative and advance inclusive and win-win economic globalization.
The aforementioned Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) is of particular interest. Amid China’s domestic overproduction problems, combined with the real estate crisis and the country’s economic slowdown, Beijing is seeking to convince Asian countries to host Silk Road infrastructure projects, one of the main outlets for domestic production capacity that can no longer be contained within its borders.
In addition, China has gained access to natural and strategic resources (oil, natural gas, and minerals) from more precarious countries in Africa, South America, and the Middle East. Gas pipelines from Central Asia and Russia, and oil imports from Russia, Iraq, Brazil, and Oman, have reduced China’s dependence on Japan, South Korea, and the United States, according to the International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS). Brazilian soybeans free China from its dependence on U.S. farmers, while allowing the Chinese government to respond to Trump’s tariffs with trade retaliation that carries considerable political weight. However, China has been criticized by countries that have joined the BRI for the volume of debt generated, economic and political dependence, environmental damage, and increased Chinese interference in the internal affairs of the nations involved.
This is where it is important not to lose sight of the limits of the “selective affinities” between China and its partners. Beijing has regional and border security issues with some of the key members of the SCO, starting with India and Russia.
The current security relationship between China and India is characterized by a combination of cooperation and deep mistrust, shaped largely by historical conflicts and ongoing border tensions. Both countries have heavily militarized their border areas and experienced multiple clashes and skirmishes in various sectors since then. In 2020, the border conflict over the Arunachal Pradesh region in the Himalayas resulted in dozens of soldiers killed, particularly from India, whose population protested in the streets against the Chinese government.
In 2024 and 2025, China and India took steps to reduce tensions, including a border agreement in October 2024 to manage patrols and reduce tensions, but mutual skepticism persists. India’s recent naval maneuvers to project its power in Africa and China’s growing collaboration with Pakistan (which had an episode of military conflict with India in 2025) show a broader strategic competition that goes beyond bilateral issues.
ASEAN (Association of Southeast Asian Nations) countries like Vietnam, Thailand, Cambodia, Laos, and Malaysia were present and remain cautious due to maritime disputes in the South China Sea. Vietnam and China have disputes mainly over maritime territories and rights to resources in the region, specifically regarding sovereignty over islands such as the Paracel and Spratly Islands. China’s expansive “nine-dash line” claim overlaps with Vietnam’s exclusive economic zone (EEZ). China’s growing military presence is seen as both a strategic realignment and a source of concern and mistrust by countries that are economically dependent on China.
Even with Russia, there are latent tensions. Although it currently projects particularly close relations with Russia, China views with caution Moscow’s growing influence over North Korea, a strategic player for Beijing in the territorial separation of the Chinese mainland from U.S. military bases in South Korea and Japan. For Putin, China’s diplomatic, political, and economic offensive on the countries of Central Asia, which for centuries — both during the imperial regime and the Soviet period — were under Russia’s influence, is unwelcome. China has become the main trading partner of countries such as Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan, and Kyrgyzstan, as well as Tajikistan and Uzbekistan, all of which are members of the SCO. Meanwhile, Mongolia, China and Russia maintain balanced tensions on border issues, which remain enough of a concern that the governments agreed to a trilateral meeting during the SCO.
Similar challenges seen in the expansion of BRICS are also evident in the growth of the SCO: it remains largely a council of divergent states, united by a shared sense of horror at the disruptive and chaotic policies of Trump and the United States. Russia and China are deepening their strategic cooperation, albeit with tensions. India, meanwhile, finds itself weakened; edging closer to Beijing from a position of vulnerability after getting burned by Trump. Turkey has its own game in the Middle East and wants to have cards on all tables, from NATO to the SCO. Iran, extremely weakened after the bombings by Israel and the United States, is clinging to its Asian allies, especially China and Russia, but as a regional power in decline. It is unlikely that these circumstances will produce a cohesive bloc aligned fully with China’s agenda.
However, the mere possibility of such contradictory ties being forged is a sign of the difficulties the U.S. faces in consolidating solid allies in Asia and across the world. “Hegemonic weaknesses” matter. Trump’s policy of rejecting alliances that were once taken for granted is creating a confusing and peculiar landscape, typical of a period of transition. As Michael Roberts has pointed out, “the U.S.-led imperialist bloc remains dominant, but its dominance is being challenged as never before.” Domination does not imply hegemony, and its decline favors new experiments in construction by China, which seeks to elevate its position in the capitalist system of exploitative states around the world.
Xi Jinping and the Chinese government, however, should not by any means be seen as a progressive alternative to U.S. hegemony. Indeed they are in fact part of the global disorder led by Donald Trump and the Western imperialist governments. The intensification of international competition between powers, the war in Ukraine, the genocide in Palestine, and the authoritarian drift of bourgeois liberal democratic regimes are all symptoms of cracks in the architecture of the unstable capitalist equilibrium. Informal work, precariousness and exploitation, the oppression of women and ethnic minorities, in their Chinese version, are not an alternative to American brutality. Political independence from rival capitalist models, between China and the United States, is the essential condition for a determined struggle against imperialism and its destructive tendencies. In this sense, the coming battles in the field of class struggle will be decisive.
Originally published in Portuguese on September 2 in Esquerda Diário