Trump expresses annoyance with Putin and makes a U-turn on Ukraine. Beyond his gangsterish language, the U.S. president has once again proved himself unpredictable and unreliable, giving the impression of constantly improvising. The risk for him is a “Bidenization” of his Ukraine policy.
“So far, I have been very disappointed with President Putin,” President Trump said this week. “I have solved a lot of wars in the last three months, but I haven’t got this one yet. This is a Biden war. It’s not a Trump war. I am here to try and get us out of that mess.” These words contrast with Trump’s supposedly “pro-Russian” statements he made after taking office, but they should come as no surprise.
Trump came to office promising to end wars, but his administration’s “peace policy” is a failure. Instead, he has encouraged the continuation of Israel’s genocide in Gaza and has been unable to end the war in Ukraine. Worse still, he has opened a new front against Iran, bombing it alongside Netanyahu. The wars Trump claims to have “resolved” are those in the Congo, where, despite the agreement signed between the DRC and Rwanda in Washington at the end of June, clashes continue between paramilitary groups supported by one camp and the other, and in Sudan, where an agreement is being negotiated between the United States, Saudi Arabia, Egypt, and the United Arab Emirates. This approach, according to researchers Abdul Mohammed and Alex de Waal, “may, in fact, bring about a cessation of hostilities. But what would follow such a deal is not peace in the true sense. It is a ceasefire grounded in commercial incentives and strategic convenience.” In other words, very fragile “resolutions.”
In this context, as Trump faces his limitations in stopping the war in Ukraine, he seems to have decided to pressure the Kremlin by offering Kyiv defensive weapons. At the same time, Trump has given Putin 50 days to come to an agreement; otherwise, he will impose secondary sanctions on Russia (i.e., he will impose heavy penalties on states that trade with Moscow). This policy is more or less the same as Biden’s, which he criticizes so much and which has proved incapable of changing Moscow’s plans.
A Policy That Reveals Trump’s Attitude to Ukraine
Contrary to what Trump says, the war in Ukraine never was just “Biden’s war.” Trump heavily armed Ukraine from the moment he took office in 2017, setting the stage for the current war. Through this “turn,” Trump is only confirming that this war belongs to him too. As we wrote in an October 2024 article about his future foreign policy,
Trump’s “pacifist” policy is nothing more than a mirage. He has indeed already suggested that he could further arm Ukrainian forces in the event of Putin’s refusal to negotiate. Far from Trump’s “pro-Russian” appearances, during his first term, the president’s policies were just as hostile and aggressive toward Russia. Trump’s plan for Ukraine is to “get rid” of the issue and to place the burden on the European powers. The corollary of this policy is to pressure his NATO allies to increase their military spending.
This last element is very clear in Trump’s new policy toward Ukraine. Last Sunday, he said, “We basically are going to send them various missiles, very sophisticated, military, and they are going to pay us 100 percent for them, and that’s the way we want it.” He wasn’t really talking about the Ukrainians but about western European powers, since it is they who will buy the arms. This is central to Trump’s policy, which has been weakened domestically. It allows him to continue military support for Ukraine, which is contested by his social base, while ensuring that this does not cost the U.S. anything financially and that, on the contrary, it represents an opportunity for the U.S. military industry. In geopolitical terms, as political science professor Robert E. Kelly explains, “deferring the strategic challenge to Europe is essential, too. If a Ukrainian deep strike with NATO weapons leads to Russian retaliation, then Europe needs to debate and handle that on its own. By insisting that Europe buy the weapons, Trump increases European ownership of any costs or blowback.”
This policy is not viewed unfavorably by the major European powers. On the contrary, it can provide them with an excellent pretext for legitimizing increased military spending and increasingly authoritarian policies in the eyes of their populations. It may be accompanied, however, by certain contradictions in the medium term between the interests of the continent’s different bourgeoisies, who do not all have the same motivations for supporting Ukraine. Another downside for European leaders is Trump himself. The Economist, in an otherwise enthusiastic article on the North American arms transfer, points out that
in theory, [Trump] could impose sanctions that reduced Russia’s export earnings without greatly affecting the oil price. But if they were strict enough to choke off the Kremlin’s energy exports, the oil price would soar, causing an inflation shock that Mr Trump might find intolerable. The big buyers of Russia’s oil exports are China (47 percent) and India (38 percent). Mr Trump has backed away from an all-out trade war with China and is in negotiations with India. Tellingly, investors do not believe in Mr Trump’s brinkmanship. After he threatened to cut off Russia, the oil price fell.
A Turning Point That Reinforces Russian Mistrust
But it’s not just the European imperialists who are wary of Trump; Putin himself knows that he cannot trust him, thanks to the Kremlin’s experience of Trump’s first term. Since then, like the rest of the world, Russian leaders have seen how the Trump administration betrayed Iran, which was bombed by Israel in the middle of negotiations, and then bombed by the United States itself. Trump’s turn only strengthens the Russians’ mistrust (and that of Washington’s other rivals). Indeed, even if Trump had initially offered Putin very favorable conditions regarding Ukraine to get him to conclude a ceasefire agreement, this would not be enough for the Kremlin. Since the beginning of the war, Putin has repeated that he wants a demilitarized Ukraine and that its integration into NATO must be “definitively” abandoned. To this must now be added territorial claims acquired during the war. Trump cannot offer this to Russia because it would mean a complete capitulation by Ukraine and a defeat for NATO, and therefore also for the United States. Even if he wanted to, it is highly unlikely that the Europeans would follow him. This is what drives him to pressure one side or the other, and to take more or less abrupt turns that give the impression of total incoherence.
In recent days, we have seen messages suggesting that Trump is encouraging the Ukrainian army to strike at Moscow and St. Petersburg, followed by a message warning the Ukrainians not to do so. Words have no value in Trump’s mouth. But in practice, he is moving step by step toward a stalemate. The choices seem to be narrowing. Moreover, European warmongers, ready to fight “until the last Ukrainian,” are trying to keep the United States engaged in this reactionary war.
Russia, for its part, has its own contradictions. While Ukraine is in a very complicated situation and the new weapons will not enable it to win the war, the Russian army is not really winning either, at least from a strategic point of view. Putin has not yet succeeded in keeping Ukraine away from the Western powers; he has not yet succeeded in capturing any major cities, and it is by no means certain that Ukraine will be demilitarized by the end of the war. Ukraine is more strategic for Russia than it is for the United States, and Putin needs to win. Zelenskyy has a lot at stake too: his country’s territorial integrity and the political survival of his regime. In this sense, any peace negotiations will be very complicated as long as one of the parties does not capitulate. In other words, everyone seems to be betting on a “resolution” on the ground. But neither side seems about to break the other’s resistance. The war will therefore continue, bringing with it further loss of life, material destruction, and perhaps the survival of governments.
First published in French on July 19 in Révolution Permanente